Mike Koolidge, filling in for Dan Proft, welcomed Andrew Collingwood, co-host of the Multipolarity podcast and writer of the Multipolarity Brief on Substack, to discuss the ongoing standoff over the Strait of Hormuz and the broader strategic dilemma facing the Trump administration. Koolidge, drawing on his own time in Kuwait and Iraq during the early days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, framed the conversation around Collingwood’s recent column arguing there is no viable alternative to the strait as a strategic chokepoint.
Collingwood described President Trump’s current position using an extended martial arts metaphor, comparing it to a submission hold in which opposing forces pull in different directions simultaneously. He explained that American air power has proven unable to fully suppress Iran’s capacity to launch missiles and drones capable of threatening U.S. bases and disrupting Gulf energy exports, while the alternative, accepting terms resembling the earlier Islamabad memorandum of understanding, would represent what he called a painful crystallization of American strategic defeat in the conflict.
Collingwood pushed back against what he described as an emerging, overly optimistic narrative suggesting the Strait of Hormuz will become a diminishing strategic asset as Gulf states build bypass pipelines to export oil without relying on the waterway. He argued this view mistakes Iran’s underlying strategic objective, waging what he called a countervalue campaign designed to inflict broad economic pressure on the United States, for the specific method Iran happened to use to pursue it. Collingwood noted that Iran has already demonstrated the accuracy and willingness to strike heavily defended infrastructure, including sophisticated missile defense radar systems, arguing that if the strait were bypassed entirely, Iran could simply shift to targeting pipeline infrastructure, export terminals, and refineries directly, a more difficult target set to rebuild than reopening a blocked shipping lane.
Collingwood attributed the current strategic stalemate to the global proliferation of precision-guided missile and drone technology over the past several decades, technology once monopolized largely by the United States during the Gulf Wars but now widely available to smaller state actors. He argued that the economic exchange rate of intercepting relatively inexpensive drones with multimillion-dollar missile interceptors favors adversaries willing to absorb sustained losses, allowing determined nations like Iran to wage prolonged campaigns despite facing the world’s most powerful air force. He noted that Iran’s strikes have increasingly shifted from broader economic pressure tactics toward direct attacks on American military installations, including a recent strike on a U.S. base in Jordan that resulted in American casualties.
Asked about the prospect of a broader international coalition assisting American operations, Collingwood offered a stark assessment of British military capacity, describing significant delays in deploying air defense-equipped naval assets to the region following an attack on a UK base in Cyprus, and argued that no combination of European, Gulf, or Asian allies possesses sufficient expeditionary military capability to meaningfully supplement American and Israeli forces in achieving a decisive outcome.
Collingwood closed by suggesting that a longer-term resolution might eventually require accepting some version of a diplomatic arrangement similar to the earlier nuclear agreement framework, arguing that Iran’s current willingness to absorb military and economic damage stems partly from its current isolation from the global trading system. He suggested that a version of Iran genuinely reintegrated into international commerce would have considerably more to lose from continued conflict, potentially altering its calculus over time, even if reaching that point proves difficult and uncomfortable in the near term.